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Before Anticipation 
 
Abstract 
The possibility of any recognition of 'access', as such, would be constituted in the future 
anterior, what I would retrospectively encounter, or encounter again, as that which marks or 
constitutes a threshold or opening. The temporality of 'access' may be understood via terms 
we encounter in phenomenology's understanding of 'presencing': anticipation and 
recollection, or 'thrownness' and 'futurity'. We may consider the notion of 'journal' as an 
inscribing-presencing, as that which accounts for the 'day' as such, a temporalising of 
accessibility according to the peculiar notion that every encountered is necessarily a re-
encounter, whose 'time' is that of an already happened. This paper engages these notions in 
order to question the journal, and the phenomenon of access, in terms of what grounds an ethics 
of the future anterior and what constitutes the movement from ethics to politics in journal 
practices. Key to this discussion will be two texts by Jacques Derrida from Acts of Literature: 
Before the Law, in Derrida's discussion of Kafka's understanding of the Law of the 'gate', and 
The Law of Genres, particularly Derrida's discussion of Maurice Blanchot's Madness of the Day. 
 
 
Before Anticipation 
 
Access critical perspectives on communication, cultural and policy studies. What if it were all 
fiction? Fictitious. But for all that, written in truth, faithfully, faithful, written with fidelity. All 
fiction, then? All of it? Or, perhaps, an obligation? He will have obliged me to access these 
things, a command, of sorts. Invocation. We run here against the hard grain of writing, the 
hard grain of its genres, its laws and the Law of its laws. Would there be perspectives on that, 
viewpoints in the plural? Would the law of its laws, the law of writing’s polyvalence, law of 
perspectivalism, have points of view? But, then, who would name that law, and in whose 
language, in what writing, would it be written? Perhaps, the 'law' of perspectivalism could go 
by the name 'access', accessibility as such, openness-to-what-is, disclosure, unconcealing, 
sensible sun, shortest shadow, noon. Noon's lighting on communication, on culture, on policy, 
polis, what is most question-worthy. Noon's glare, daylight, showing the political as question of 
communicability and culture, belonging. But, then, it may well go by the name 'nihilism'. Or, 
rather, access amounts to the same thing, nihilism. Critical perspectives, were they to be other 
than fictions, would be anything but perspectives, viewpoints. But, then, that supposes we 
understand how we cross a threshold between fiction and its others. And that we understand, 
in the first place, what that word 'fiction' names.  
 
Three lines of thinking are converging in a consideration of asking how the scholarly journal 
becomes a problem for access, or how the journal, Access, enables a disclosing questioning of 
scholarship's writing practices. Those lines include the two mentioned above, Jacques 
Derrida's deconstructions of the binary separation of logos and mythos, law and story, fiction 
and its others, as well as Derrida's encounter with Maurice Blanchot's story of the brutal 
finality of all possible story, again deconstructing a Law that constitutes the law of writing's 
genres. The third, I think, has always already secreted itself somewhere in that deconstruction 
that goes by the name Derrida and is concealed, for all that, in Derrida's writing on the Law 
of writing. It would be Heidegger's Nietzsche in the guise of Nietzsche's 'Word', God is dead. 
Nietzsche's guise, geist, specter and, for Derrida, his women, Nietzsche's women, semblances, 
masks, seducers-at-a-distance, show, point to a Law of genre that would, more primordially, 
more acutely, be a law of gender, writing's sexual differences or sexual difference's trace-
structure.1 It would not be as if this was missed with Blanchot, or overlooked with Kafka. 
Hence we begin to build on the stakes of this question of access, scholarship, scholarship and 
writing, daily practices, journal practices, communication, culture and policy: writing's genres, 
writing's genders. 
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The peculiarity of the 'Journal' is its seriality. On the one hand, this repetitious frequency (or 
infrequency), this regularity and rhythmic annularity, return of things to their proper, presents 
no real problem. Day follows night. Orderability is construed on there being, in advance, a 
proper to which something or someone returns, a day, date, repetition of a name or names, 
titles and so on. Things, in general, are assimilable, accessible on the basis of such repetitions, 
repetition-compulsion orderability itself. But, for all that, and on the other hand, it is precisely 
this repetition-compulsion of an orderability-coming-before, in order that what is to come can 
have its return before it leaves-to-arrive, that makes seriality peculiar. In this sense, 'access' 
opens to the unknown as an already knowable, hence assimilable, repeatable and returnable 
thing. If I mentioned above its curious temporality of a future anterior, what in a future I will 
have come to understand as the already understood, this means what I encounter for a 'first 
time' must be encounterable as the retrieving of what I had already known. Every thing is re-
covered, or never encounterable as such, accessed again, or oblivious. But we need to 
understand this curious temporality perhaps in the way that Derrida, elsewhere than in his 
writing on the Law of genres and genders, engages the serial, or what he calls sériature, in the 
writing of Emmanuel Levinas, and for all that no less concerned with writing's sexual 
differences.2 We would need to approach the sériature of the journal in the way Levinas 
understands interruption. And in this, the way he understands ethics. We return to this ethics, 
and its passage from communicability, acculturation and polity, from politics, as concluding 
remarks. 
 
The posse grows, posse, from the Latin for power as potentiality, for what is possible; already we 
have a handful: Derrida, Kafka, Blanchot, Heidegger, Nietzsche and now Levinas.3 Enough 
to fill a volume. Many. We need to gather them, find something generic, a genus that would 
have made their mention cohere. But this would, as posse, as potential, to already be before the 
law, and it is this ‘before’ that is to become our question, a question of Law as possibility and 
its ‘before’ as the im/possible. The implacable undecidability at stake is that we can 
supposedly decide between the posse, potential, possibility and the im/posse, the impasse, the 
imposter, the one who feigns genuine posse, power-to-be. Access would not then, with the 
impasse, be a question of lighting a way, pointing or showing, but of breaking into and 
thereby further contaminating what feigns and feigns its feign. Derrida engages this break-in 
technique in Before the Law, with respect to a question as to what genre we would use to 
consign Kafka’s short parable: 
 
What then decided that Before the Law belongs to what we think we understand 
under the name of literature? And who decides? Who judges? To focus these 
questions (what and who), I ought to stress that neither of them will be privileged 
and that they concern literature rather than belles-lettres, poetry or discursive art 
in general, although these distinctions remain highly problematical. 
 
The double question, then, would be as follows: “Who decides, who judges, and 
according to what criteria, that this relation belongs to literature?” (Derrida, 
1992a: 187) 
 
This story recounts the narrative of a ‘man from the country’ who comes for admittance to 
the Law. Admittance is by way of a doorkeeper who is before the Law. The first sentence of 
Kafka’s story reads: “Before the Law stands a doorkeeper” (ibid. 183). The doorkeeper is 
‘before’ though in a sense quite different to the man from the country.  There are already two 
‘befores’, a doorkeeper before the Law who does not seeking admittance but who is the 
(initial) one who grants admittance. Before the doorkeeper is the man from the country. Two 
times, two temporalities that cannot quite coincide, though they seem to be re-countable in  
simultaneity, or at least in the co-present space of a scene. Is admittance access, though? Is 
seeking and granting admittance coincident with something essential to a question of access? 
Would these two ‘befores’, each in its singularity and a Law that obliges both, be the stakes of 
‘access’? The doorkeeper suggests that admittance is possible, but not for now, not at this 
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moment, now. This moment, now, is denied—only to be recounted in a future that is 
indeterminate. The gate is open. Nothing prohibits entry, save for the doorkeeper’s escalation 
of posse, his posse in increasing degrees of power, other doorkeepers beyond this gate, at other 
gates (indeed, not unlike the posse of increasing powers I have posted above, as guardians of 
this text in its here and now). Before the Law then becomes the posse, possibility of infinite 
delays with infinite gates, ever increasing degrees of power that impose, infinitely impose, 
make impotent and construe the Law as an impossible.  
 
The Law’s power resides essentially in its before, in the temporalization of antecedence as 
such, gatekeepers in advance, in anticipation of arriving there. The Law is precisely what can 
never be arrived at, never is.  The man from the country delays his entry, always impossibly 
possible, until the end. At that end he asks the doorkeeper why no one other than he has come 
this way to gain access to the Law. The doorkeeper explains simply: “No one else could ever 
be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it.” Derrida 
reads the Kafka text as opening to text-production in general. The doorkeeper may well be 
the place of yet another posse: “critics, academics, literary theorists, writers, philosophers. They 
all have to appeal to a law and appear before it, at once to watch over it and be watched by it. 
They all interrogate it naively on the singular and the universal, and none receive an answer 
that does not involve différance: (no) more law and (no) more literature” (ibid. 215)  
 
Blanchot’s Madness of the Day more explicitly engages us with that double of the before, what 
Derrida will come to call the law of the law of genres, where that Law, like the step-not-taken 
by the man for the country, an infinite delay, a pas that is not, a beyond that is not, an im-
posse-ability that construes the Law as nullity, as an essential nothing. In this story there are 
also guardians of the Law, those who oblige accountability, doctors, lawyers, the police, those 
who are before the Law in the sense of Kafka’s doorkeepers. Then there is the Law itself, 
whose access is encountered by the impossible, by the story of an impossible story, the re-coil 
of what remains in what cannot be said:  
 
It is the récit of an impossible récit whose “production” occasions what happens, or 
rather, what remains; but the récit does not relate it, nor relate to it as to an outside 
reference, even if everything remains foreign to it and out of bounds. It is even less 
feasible for me to relate to you the story of La folie du jour which is staked precisely on the 
possibility and the impossibility of relating a story. (Derrida, 1992b. 234) 
 
That impossibility? La loi. The Law—feminine affirmation—no longer representatives of the 
Law but the Law herself. She is not woman; rather a silhouette. The crucial passage in 
Blanchot’s text: 
 
Behind their backs, I perceived the silhouette of the law. Not the familiar law, who is 
strict and not terribly agreeable: this one was different. Far from falling prey to her 
menace, I was the one who seemed to frighten her. According to her, my glance was 
lightning and my hands, grounds on which to perish. Moreover, she ridiculously 
attributed to me all kinds of power, she declared herself perpetually at my knee. But she 
let me demand nothing, and when she granted me the right to be in all places, that 
meant that I hadn’t a place anywhere. When she placed me above the authorities, that 
meant: you are authorized to do nothing. (Blanchot, 1999: 197) 
 
Nowhere and nothing. The jour, day, its madness is the Law, mad law; not law of madness; 
there is no law of madness. Rather the law is mad. She at my knee, my geneou, my je/nous, my 
I/we, my being-in-common. That’s where this madness is, resides, in me, nowhere and 
authorizing nothing. Communicability as such, acculturation as such, polity as such: a being-
in-common whose Law of the together is madness and whose belonging is guarded by the 
representatives, menaces of the Law, watching and being watched. The récit, story of this story 
is unrecountable, impossible, without story, without récit. The posse never stops obliging me to 
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recount. She, on the other hand, attributes to me all kinds of powers, above authority. This is 
silhouette, dark, obscure, a nullity: nihil. Revaluation of the highest value. Overturning of the 
sensible sun, semblance, sensuality, appearance, becoming as the true world. God is dead. To 
be in all places: perspectivalism. No place secures the truth. I am anywhere that affords my 
value. I am above the authorities, authorized without authority, nullity of all authority, nothing 
any longer necessity: everything contingent, open, possible. Access is my perspective, from 
moment to moment, on what is at stake in communicability, acculturation, polity, anchored, 
fixed, certain to and of nothing and nowhere. Double affirmation. Yes to yes. Yes to the open, 
to the unsecured, the abyss, the leap.  
 
Heidegger’s long engagement with Nietzsche in his 1936-41 lecture courses has a kind of 
summary postscript in his essay “The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead,” delivered on 
numerous occasions in 1943. We necessarily encounter the complex relations of the 
overturning of Platonism, death of God, nihilism and will-to-power as essence of the way in 
which will wills. The assertion of power, power above authority is the uniting of will and what 
will wills. Heidegger comments on Nietzsche’s aphorism from Genealogy of Morals “ It (the will) 
will rather will Nothing, than not will” (Heidegger, 1977: 79). Heidegger comments: 
 
“Willing Nothing” does not in the least mean willing the mere absence of everything 
real; rather it means precisely willing the real, yet willing the latter always and 
everywhere as a nullity and, through this, willing only annihilation. In such willing, 
power always further secures it itself the possibility of command and the ability-to-be-
master. (ibid.) 
 
The essence of value positing, of perspective or point-of-view, is the preservation-enhancement 
of will-to-power. What is ‘permanent’ is what for the moment holds to be true, what is set in 
place before, re-presented as such. The Law of its holding-together is madness but precisely 
that madness of an originary kind, madness of the proper, return, annular circumference and 
restoration of the day. Inscription of that day, time of that day happens with the double 
binding constriction of the before and the before, before the before, before the Law and before 
that before of the Law. The laws of differences, genres, species, races, gens, life-preservation 
and enhancement, sexual differences and the Law of these laws, the law that infinitely 
withdraws into the effacement of being. Eternal return of the Same, unreality of the real, 
worklessness of the work, we would want to understand more carefully the temporalisation of 
this doubling of a ‘before’ which produces the Work in its completion (the doorkeeper is able 
to shut the gate, complete the work as nothing) and the ‘work’ in its affirmative annihilation, 
night, the impossibility of a story ever again.  
 
We suggested, at the beginning, that Levinas offers an understanding of an ethics of return-as-
interruption. Derrida engages the ethics Levinas recognises in interruption in terms of the 
future anterior of a Levinasian ‘he will have obliged me’. That obligation is infinite. It is 
responsibility for what comes, the infinitely strange, before the question of being’s ‘what is’ 
comes, before the before of, beyond, essence, beyond, before will, will-to-power, will-to-will. 
That future anterior of infinite obligation happens as interruption to being’s mastery, for the 
sake of one’s being. Two times, the synchrony of a totalizing communicability in the Said, and 
a diachrony, a time infinitely before and infinitely futural, a time out of this continuous 
existence, interrupting, breaking it, but effaced in that break, disappearing into that break, that 
break re-tied, thread knotted, cut jointed. The trace-structure of the binds doubly mark that 
effacement of the said, present two times of a before. The binds, necessarily, are an otherwise 
said, not the pure-trace-structure of the Saying, impossibly said, but the double feigning of the 
feign of continuity, broken and retied, the mark of a before of an impossibly inscribed before of 
the before, the Law of an obligation that Derrida traces, in Levinas, in E.L., as the trace-
structure of a radical feminine, la loi impossibly recounted. She will have obliged me, in truth, 
as primordial ethics, to the interruption to every serial return to the proper, the titled or titular 
sense of the communicable, the cultural, the political. For the rest, for all of the others to 
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fiction, they rest, remain with the representatives of the Law, with their posses, possibilities, 
games of truth and errancy, critical perspectives and feigns of access, feigns of feigns of 
accessibility, binds and double bindings of knots of an otherwise Said. 
 
Notes 
 
1. See especially Derrida (  ) Spurs: On Nietzsche’s Styles. In this short text, Derrida engages 
in a sustained way the question of sexual difference in Nietzsche’s writings, the 
polysemy of “woman” in Nietzsche’s texts. Spurs also engages Heidegger, and 
Heidegger on Nietzsche (and hence Heidegger’s styles, sexual difference in his texts), 
at one moment undecidably offering the “Nietzsche” of the title as the titular naming 
of Heidegger’s ‘opus magnum’, his four volumes on Nietzsche. 
2. Derrida develops this notion of sériature in response to Levinas’s major philosophical 
work, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Otherwise than Being was itself a response to 
Derrida’s deconstruction of Levinas’s in “Violence and Metaphysics,” where Derrida 
emphasised the necessity for Levinas to use all the resources of ontology in order to 
posit a Beyond.  In Otherwise than Being, Levinas attempts a writing style that, within the 
‘Said’ of ontology’s constrictions, a ‘Saying’ of an ‘otherwise’ is traced. This trace-
structure happens in interruption. Derrida’s sériature is that trace-structure of a 
primordial though non-inscribable series of interruptions, which break with being’s 
totalizing continuity. Crucially, the time of continuity is synchronic. The time of 
interruption is diachronic. 
3. Antonio Negri has adopted the term ‘posse’ in his Spinozist discussion of power, 
potentiality and the multitude. He is particularly interested in a notion of constitutive 
power as a power derived from a kind of permanent contestation of constituted 
authority (State power), a contestation that happens in ongoing assemblages that 
themselves are unstable. He mentions the romantic American West notion (perhaps 
more a fiction of cinema) of the posse that forms with spontaneity and for limited 
duration and then disbands, perhaps in order to form otherwise. See Negri   . This is 
how I see the posse constituting itself as representative of the Law. While the 
representatives are an unstable multitude, that Law by which they are constituted is 
the fiction of the permanent as such. 
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